J.L. Liu, S.F. Liu

Pages: 269-280

Abstract
Using dynamic game theory, this paper analyzes the interest relationship between government supervision departments, railway passenger transport enterprises and integrated service agents in the service management system of railway passenger transport enterprises in China. A tripartite dynamic game model of government supervision department, railway passenger transport enterprise and integrated service agent is established. Inverse induction algorithm is used to solve the game model, and the expected return equilibrium solution of government supervision department, railway passenger transport enterprise and integrated service agent is analyzed. The results show that the cost of railway passenger transport service management and the intensity of management are important factors affecting the implementation of service requirements by railway passenger transport enterprises and integrated service agents. Therefore, the government supervision department should reduce the management cost, design a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism, and improve the enthusiasm of railway passenger transport enterprises and integrated service agents to strengthen service management and improve service quality. Railway passenger transport enterprises and integrated service agents should actively strengthen service management, improve service quality, reduce management pressure and cost at the next level, and promote the healthy development of railway passenger transport market through a virtuous cycle between the three.
Keywords: passenger transport; service management; dynamic game; backward induction